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Abstract 
This paper surrounds innovation as socially constructed and posits a model for 
innovation policy based on Mode 2 knowledge production (Gibbons et al 
1984), where scientific peer review is replaced by merit review demanded by 
accountability to a wider social, economic and political sphere. The paper 
looks at scientific research into rare diseases and the strategies being adopted 
by biotechnology companies. The paper then introduces the EU Orphan Drug 
Regulation (2000) and raises concerns about the pharmaceutical industries’ use 
of publicly funded research and patent protection. Other barriers to patients 
actually receiving new treatments, even if they get as far as production, are 
raised in the final section. 
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1. Background 
According to Perspectives on Business Innovation; 
www.businessinnovation.ey.com/journal/issue4/features/welcome/body.html  
20.11.00.  
 
‘The present pace of discovery in genetics, neuroscience and medical 
measurement technology guarantees that the early decades of the 
millennium will be defined by biotechnology and the life sciences’. 
 
It could be argued that we are moving from an information economy to a bio-
economy (Rifkin1998, Oliver 1999). Multiple technological innovations may 
lead to the development of new medical treatments. Established 
pharmaceutical companies may face increased competition from new dynamic 
entrepreneurial biotechnology enterprises. Advances in theory and research are 
needed to develop appropriate responses and provide frameworks that will 
influence the innovation process in the 21st Century biotechnology industry. 
The conceptual frameworks of National Systems of Innovation (NSI) 
concentrate on the supply side, ignoring consumer demand and the influence of 
the media upon this demand (Senker et al p2, 1999). Globalisation and 
multinationals render NSIs incomplete if not obsolete. According to Senker et 
al (p80): 
‘Controversies appear when the distribution of expertise during the 
innovation process does not take into account some potentially 
interested actors. The controversies begin when some actors who 
claim the right to participate to the definition of risks, costs and 
benefits [the factors in technology assessment] are not included in the 
management of innovation’. 
According to Senker et al (1999), technology assessment includes risk, 
efficiency of new technologies and even the direction taken by scientific and 
technological research. It could be argued that social movements may prove 
more effective, in the analysis of technology assessment, than ‘unconnected’ 
government agencies and proclaimed ‘experts’. There have been attempts to 
show policy- makers listen to the ‘public’ but, as Senker et al (p81,1999) 
suggest,  
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‘Consultation processes are no more than a cheap way to give the 
illusion of participation’ (by the ‘public’).  
Innovation has been studied from the perspectives of social psychology, 
economics, business studies, sociology and science and technology studies. 
Collyer (1996) claims that factors in the social or technical environment are 
subsumed in psychology, by an emphasis on the personality structure or 
cognitive activity within the individual. In the area of business studies and 
economics the emphasis has been on the development and transfer of products 
to the market rather than on the creation of new products – largely ignoring 
inventions that have no, or limited, commercial application (like orphan drugs) 
where invention is left un-theorised and few studies theorise innovation itself, 
or in fact innovations that have ‘failed’: 
‘In brief, these studies suppose that the ‘market’ is an entity existing 
separately from ‘society’; that self- interest fundamentally organises 
behaviour in the market; that innovations are the result of ‘technical 
factors’ which are inherent properties of inventions and must, by dint 
of their survival in the market place, cons titute an improvement over 
existing technologies and that science and scientific principles form 
the basis of, and are essential precursors to technological 
development’   (Collyer, 1996, p9) 
According to Collyer (1996) other scholars report that the level of innovation 
is affected by factors such as the size, structure and ownership of the firm, the 
existence, or competition from, other products and the relationship between the 
enterprise (in this case biotechnology), clients (in this case patients), 
government or suppliers (in this case government regulation and patients who 
supply their knowledge and ‘bodies’). This suggests that innovativeness is 
stimulated by factors internal or external to the firm. Sociological and 
philosophical studies recognise the market as socially constituted, as is 
innovation (see Collyer 1996, p10, Winner 1977). Therefore innovation is 
subject to, and shaped by, differing interests and hierarchies of power. 
Metcalfe (2000) further suggests that innovation is a ‘combinatorial 
explosion.’ 
Social studies of science and technology of the processes of technological 
development and diffusion (Pinch & Bijker 1984 et al) have also challenged 
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the technology trajectory and the linear approach to innovation. However few 
studies have concent rated on the social, cultural or political process of 
innovation, the focus being on the adoption and diffusion processes. According 
to Collyer (1996) most studies, which theorise the social formation of ideas 
and knowledge, focus on the locus of scientific knowledge production, in the 
research laboratory (see Knorr- Cetina 1995 in Jasanoff et al 1995, Latour 
1987). These studies ignore the political and ideological influences from 
external sources and other sites of knowledge production (ergo Mode 2 sites in 
industry and for example, medical practitioners seeking solutions to practical 
problems, or especially in this case the patients and their advocates). In the OD 
‘market’ we can see industry, researchers (public and private), charitable 
organisations (as advocates), regulators (politics) and venture capitalists 
brought together in a public forum. 
 
The rapid pace of technological and scientific advances, together with the 
mapping of the human genome, promises more understanding of disease 
processes. These advances in informatics, proteomics, pharmacogenetics, 
stem-cell and gene therapy research show the possibilities of finding novel 
compounds for drugs and other therapeutic interventions  (Financial Times 
6.10.98) raising the hopes of people who suffer, as a minority, from rare, as yet 
untreated, genetic disorders. The subject is not isolated, rare diseases do not 
just affect the patient – families and society are affected as well. There is hope 
too for the future generations who either inherit diseases or carry recessive 
genes, that have previously bypassed his (or her) ancestors, and  ‘suddenly’ 
appear, to destroy their lives. There is also the possibility of finding new 
treatments for common disorders: 
‘Companies that produce orphan drugs tend to be highly valued in the 
market because the technology platforms they create may eventually 
yield treatments for more common diseases’ 
Jos Peeters: Vice Chairman EASDAQ  (EPPOSI 2000) 
 
There are numerous examples of research into minority diseases having 
benefits for majority populations, yielding insights into other more common 
diseases. Research on epidermolysis bullosa, a rare skin condition, laid the 
 7 
ground for knowledge of the wound healing process (www.redherring.com 
17.3.01). It was Stanley Pusiner’s research into mental illness (Kure disease) in 
an isolated tribe, whose culture included eating the brains of deceased relatives 
that led to an explanation for contagion in mad cow disease. Official response, 
although severely delayed due to bureaucratic incompetence, may have 
reduced the risk of a major epidemic. The 1985 Nobel Prize in Physiology of 
Medicine went to researchers in homozygous familial hypercholesterolemia – a 
rare disease. As long ago as 1657 the English physician William Harvey, who 
discovered the circulation of the blood wrote: 
  ‘Nowhere does nature more openly display her secret mysteries than 
in cases where she shows traces of her workings apart from the beaten 
path; nor is there any better way to advance the proper practice of 
medicine than to give our minds to the discovery of the usual law of 
Nature by careful investigation of cases of rare forms of disease’.  
Quoted in www.redherring.com 17.3.01 
According to Torrent-Farnell (2001) there are around 6,000 diseases (70-80% 
of genetic origin), out of the 30,000 known diseases, which are individually 
rare but collectively represent a significant number of patients who, at present, 
are an excluded minority. Rare diseases affect around 25million (7%) of the 
population in the European Union. The majority of sufferers are children, one 
third of whom will die in the first year of life. Half of the survivors may be 
handicapped for life with the remainder receiving some form of disease 
management enabling an acceptable quality of life (Torrent-Farnell, 2001). If 
ethnic minorities in this country were refused a service both society and civil 
rights groups would be offended. There is no justification, on moral grounds, 
to deny a ‘genetic minority’ the same right to health as enjoyed by the majority 
population.     
People are becoming more demanding and politicised as they become both 
more educated and better informed (Rifkin 1998). New Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT’s), especially the Internet allows patients 
and their carers to obtain knowledge about their condition and (sometimes 
false) hopes of a ‘cure’. Global communication has also led to otherwise 
dispersed patient groups (using informal networks and networking) to form 
‘virtual’ interest groups (Nonakas’ (1995) ‘cyber-ba’). National and 
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international alliances have grown to advocate for their members’ interests. 
The power and direction of influence by interest groups depends on factors 
such as leadership, members’ attributes and resources. According to Rifkin 
(1998) biotechnology has created scientific controversy unparalleled in other 
scientific spheres. Many have argued that, in the case of biotechnology, social 
welfare priorities have been ignored by those in the field with commercial 
interests (Webster 1991). There appears to be a threat to commercial R&D 
from a new source of countervailing power. United lobby groups could 
become more powerful than unions or government. To what degree will they 
influence government and company policy? 
 
2.  Innovation policy for the 21st Century? 
 
The massification of higher education, an increase in the social utility of new 
knowledge, an informed and empowered citizenry, greater accountability by 
decision makers and a broadening of research partnerships are characteristics 
of globalisation (Ohmae 1990) and Mode 2 research (Gibbons et al 1984). An 
informed and highly educated (global) citizenry (at least in the rich countries) 
now exists who are concerned with the impact on society of a range of techno-
political controversies. Will they become central actors in the innovation 
process? Governments at both national and local levels are an important force 
in science based economic development. Gibbons et al (1984) regard the 
essential difference between Mode 1 and Mode 2 to be concerned with changes 
in the mechanisms that assess quality. A pragmatic criterion becomes 
important rather than abstract rational theorising and quality assessment by 
peer review is replaced by merit review demanded by accountability to a wider 
social, economic and political sphere. Mode 2 is heterogeneous in relation to 
the skills and actors employed, trans-disciplinary in that it cuts across 
conventional disciplinary boundaries and is located in a multiplicity and 
diversity of sites. Mode 2 recognises the complexity, non- linearity and 
reflexivity of knowledge production recognising that Mode 2 contributes 
theoretical structures, research methods and modes of practice different from 
mono-disciplinary regimes. Mode 2 then replaces, or transforms, established 
institutions, practices and policies. 
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An innovation model for the 21st Century could be based on Mode 2 
knowledge production and a social constructionist approach. Gibbons et al 
(1994, p160) suggests ‘It is that people in their fungibility, multicompetence 
and capacity to connect with others are the critical resource’ requiring an 
understanding of knowledge production and exchange. Ergo ‘The best 
innovation policy is on two legs.’ 
‘As more and more aspects of life in society are perceived to involve 
issues having a techno-scientific dimension science cannot be left to 
scientists alone. The methods and techniques of knowledge production 
in Mode 2 have become important ways to investigate societal issues 
in which many individuals and groups have some stake…. 
Interactions between science and technology, on the one hand, and 
social issues on the other, have intensified. The issues are essentially 
public ones, to be debated in hybrid fora in which there is no entrance 
ticket in terms of expertise’  
Gibbons et al (1994). 
Gibbons et al explore major changes in the way knowledge is produced. Their 
thesis suggests: 
‘that the parallel expansion in the number of potential knowledge 
producers on the supply side and the expansion of the requirement of 
specialist knowledge on the demand side are creating conditions for 
the emergence of a new mode of knowledge production’ (p13).  
Mode 1 is mainly to be found in basic research, mostly academic, producing 
scientific documentation. Mode 2 is mainly to be found in applied research, 
mostly industrial, producing patents through the development of applications 
or processes. There may be crossovers into strategic applied research by both 
modes but in general they are different types of knowledge production, or the 
mechanism by which research benefits economic growth. New (Mode 2) 
knowledge production, and the search for economic pay-offs, is exerting 
pressure on institutionalised research to change (Ziman 1994) especially within 
Universities and government laboratories. According to Webster (1991) 
biotechnology has led to an interdisciplinary mixing of specialities in a way, 
and to a degree never seen before. Webster also suggests that the distinction 
between basic and applied research no longer seems appropriate. According to 
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Gibbons et al (1994) researchers are less firmly institutionalised as people 
come together in temporary teams and networks, which may dissolve when the 
problem has been resolved. The resulting mosaic will be complex and tracking 
will be difficult for evaluators, especially in defining the boundaries between 
research and the environment. 
Gibbons (2000) suggests that there has been an increasing public concern 
about issues to do with public health, the environment, communications and 
privacy, which have stimulated the growth of knowledge production in Mode 
2.  
‘Growing awareness about the various ways in which advances in 
science and technology can affect the public interest has increased the 
numbers of groups who wish to influence the outcome of the research 
process. This is reflected in the varied composition of the research 
teams. Social scientists work alongside natural scientists, engineers, 
lawyers and businessmen because the nature of the problems requires 
it. Social accountability permeates the whole knowledge production 
process. It is reflected not only in interpretation, and diffusion of 
results but in the definition of the problem and the setting of research 
priorities, as well. An expanding number of interest, and so called 
concerned groups are demanding representation in the setting of the 
policy agenda as well as in the subsequent decision making process. 
In Mode 2 sensitivity to the impact of the research is built in from the 
start. It forms part of the context of application.’     
Gibbons (2000).  
http://edie.cprost.sfu.ca/summer/papers/Michael.Gibbons.html 
 
This can be seen in the public backlash following the BSE fiasco and the 
concerns raised about GM crops, human cloning and the surveillance allowed 
by new ICTs. The government has responded to these concerns by ‘public 
understanding of science’ initiatives, the formation of numerous committees 
and assurances about ‘open government’. Companies are responding with 
initiatives such as ‘corporate governance’ and increased funding for public 
relations exercises. The questions are who sits on these ‘interest’ and ‘concern’ 
groups. Who funds them? How ‘open’ are they and do they represent society 
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or capitalists? There are accusations (within the US orphan drug arena) of large 
pharmaceutical firms using their wealth to lobby politicians and of actually 
funding patient groups to lobby on their behalf (Love, 1999). What will be the  
situation under the recent EU regulation? 
Today’s hyper-competitive environment means that research can no longer be 
sanctioned under the classic scientific model but moves to Erno-Kjolhede et 
al’s (2000) extension to Gibbons thesis, placed within the Triple Helix 
(University-Industry-government relations). To which I wish to add the 
‘customers’, in this case patients who provide their knowledge and tissues for 
medical research. 
 
3. Scientific Research Into Rare Diseases 
 
‘ The network of patients, scientists and industry involved in fighting rare 
diseases can provide a model for European-wide research; your [referring 
to EPPOSI workshop 2000] collaboration is far more developed than that 
of other research areas. Networks, research infrastructure and private 
investment are essential to speed up the development of therapies’ 
Bruno Hansen: Director, Quality of Life Programme – Directorate 
General of Research, EU Commission (EPPOSI 2000) 
In most cases rare diseases attract attention from small networks of 
researchers. The vital tools for scientific research are databases, DNA and 
tissue collections. These tools are needed as patients with rare diseases are 
geographically dispersed and therefore examining them individually would 
present a logistical problem. Biological databases give information on genes, 
DNA sequences, mutations and proteins. Medical databases provide 
information on diseases and drugs and also give limited access to patient 
registers. Published articles and information on research projects are available 
on the Internet for both professionals and the public, although some sites are 
hard to navigate. An example of a database is Orphanet, which was established 
by the French government. It allows access to information on research projects, 
clinical trials, clinical laboratories, professionals and patients, including 
relevant web links. 
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Published research is publicly available. However it could be argued that 
research is dependant on the interests of the particular researcher or their 
‘sponsor’. Much research may not be done because the ‘research faculty’ is not 
interested in the research (topic). Researchers may not be able to get the 
research published or pursuing a particular topic may not be good for their 
career. Also different disciplines receive varying funding dependant on their 
perceived usefulness. Research may be produced together with industry for 
competitive advantage therefore knowledge is protected (kept secret or 
patented) before publication. Knowledge may also be withheld from the public 
due to political or social reasons. Therefore research takes place in a political, 
economic and social context. University scientists, who are in constant search 
for funds, are now adopting strategic approaches to their careers, becoming 
more entrepreneurial and loosening their disciplinary affiliations. The 
consequence is an increase in the permeability of knowledge:  
‘to the extent that the imperatives of a problem context require co-
operation or networking with other practitioners, whether in 
industrial, governmental or university laboratories, whether 
nationally or globally, the hold of established modes of knowledge 
production is weakened’ (Gibbons et al. p23) 
Uhlin et al (2000) suggest that a hybrid research culture is emerging under 
Mode 2 which points to the role of knowledge in innovation and co-operation 
amongst human actors, across multiple sites, who are the repositories of this 
multiple competent knowledge. Matusik and Hill (1998) point out that 
researchers have given little attention to knowledge issues involving malleable 
firm boundaries, which are increasingly the norm. 
The convergence of science, technology and business under Mode 2 represents 
a breakdown of clearly demarcated boundaries. Innovation and learning within 
hyper-competition will be the central rationale of new management paradigms. 
It is clear that different kinds of information may be necessary upon which to 
make sound business decisions and that the traditional organisational and 
management models may not apply to the emerging complex relationships 
between disciplines and practitioners. A mismatch between organisational 
capabilities and environmental demands has resulted in crisis. Crisis is a 
precondition for the emergence of a new theory or model. 
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Box 1: The strategy Framework 
 
Science as product: To sell or licence a portfolio of R&D projects and assets, 
in a continuous stream, to large pharmaceutical companies - or even exit by sale 
of company and then a return to Academia to start another one. 
Science as competence: The building of in-house competencies through 
cementing and expanding strategic alliances, providing consultancy services, 
selling on projects and expertise. The long term goal being to expand the 
companies portfolio and internal skills base, freeing it from resource 
dependencies and achieving autonomy 
The independent strategy: The building up of a small biotechnology firm into 
a company with core technologies, able to go from R&D to production, 
marketing, sales and distribution creating the greatest challenge to the 
established pharmaceutical  sector. 
  Source: Adapted from Rifkin (1998)      
 
A company’s strategy is dependent on its ‘product’ focus, the founders 
(entrepreneurs) focus, aims and objectives and its management style. Thus the 
networks established by dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) in informal 
collaborative links co-evolve with strategy (Norus 1998) and there will be a 
variety of approaches and network configurations from simple to complex, 
from informal to formal. Box 1 shows the basic strategy drivers in DBFs. The 
independent strategy appears to be a challenge to big pharmaceutical 
companies. Biotechnology companies, such as Genzyme and Serono have 
already produced orphan drugs for unmet medical needs. Genzyme’s new 
treatment, used to control phosphorous levels in the blood of dialysis patients, 
is expected to reach sales of $140million in 2001 with around 70% margins   
( www.redherring.com  19.09.01).  However very few companies are able to 
adopt the independent strategy due to a lack of resources and the risks involved 
in the discovery process, clinical trials and the regulatory approval of products. 
Big pharmaceutical companies may make an offer too good to refuse and the 
company may be acquired. It is perceived that DBF’s do not have the resources 
 14 
to bring a product through to market and reach independence, however a great 
deal of help is available under the OD regulation. Will this stimulate a move to 
the independent level? Will the established pharmaceutical companies allow 
this competitive threat? 
Powell et al’s (1996) statistical analysis of 225 firms was a study of networks 
and learning. The findings were that sources of knowledge are likely to be 
found in the ‘interstices between firms’, including Universities, suppliers and 
customers. This is similar to Gibbons et al’s (1994) idea of hybridization. 
Hybridisation refers to the need to accomplish tasks at the boundaries and in 
the spaces between systems and subsystems (Gibbons et al 1984, p37). 
Although Powell et al (1996) and also Powell (1998) do refer to customers, in 
relation to network structures, they do not elucidate what is meant by 
‘customer’ or the customer’s actual contribution to networks. These studies 
refer to networks and organizational learning, in collaboration with a diverse 
set of external partners, but do not include the ‘experts’ (patients and carers, or 
patient groups that have many medical experts as members) and their 
collaboration and contribution to innovation (knowledge). 
Networking is more prevalent in knowledge intensive firms (KIFs), where the 
level of technological sophistication will be ‘positively correlated with the 
intensity and number of alliances in those sectors’ (Powell et al 1998). 
‘Customers’ (patients and clinicians) in the orphan drug arena may be an 
important resource to biopharm companies as they are the experts in their 
particular condition and provide unique knowledge, material for research and 
assistance (through participation) in clinical trials. Cohen & Levinthal (1990) 
introduced the concept of absorptive capacity, the ability of organisations to 
recognise the value of new external information, assimilate it and apply it to 
commercial ends. Innovation and organisational learning is seen as a function 
of a firm’s access to knowledge and its ‘absorptive capacity’. However the  
question remains, as to what new (affordable) treatments these new 
‘customers’ actually receive in exchange for their collaboration.    
 
4. The U.S. Orphan Drug Act (1983) 
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Patient groups, without effective treatments for their conditions, provided the 
impetus for the formation of the National Organisation for Rare Disorders 
(NORD) which, with the help of the media, lobbied the Federal government to 
assist in the development of treatments for rare diseases. This culminated in the 
passage of the US Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (see Crompton 2001). There 
appears to be an unanswered question as to whether the Act encourages 
innovation and if so, at what cost (Rhode, 2000). 
Pharmaceutical companies follow the economic model based on the law of 
supply and demand (Rohde, 2000), focusing resources on the largest markets 
in order to achieve the greatest returns. Even if there was an indication that a 
compound could be used in a treatment for an orphan disease it was difficult to 
find a company that would take the research forward due to the cost of clinical 
trials and production. The mass marketplace became the driver of innovation in 
product development (Rohde, 2000). Recognising that unless incentives were 
provided the market would continue to operate on the economic model US 
sufferers of minority diseases used the power of mass lobbying and the media 
in pushing the Act, with its economic and regulatory incentives, through 
Congress. The passage of the Act was opposed by the pharmaceutical industry, 
which preferred a relaxing of FDA approval to more legislation. The Act was 
opposed by the US tax department, due to the potential costs of tax credits 
(Crompton 2001). However the Act was passed at the final hour. The Act, 
upon FDA approval of an orphan drug designation, allows a tax credit of up to 
50% of clinical trials with assistance in protocol design (especially useful to 
SMEs), government grants and contracts for clinical trials and an exclusive 
marketing right of seven years from the date of FDA marketing approval. 
These incentives were intended to encourage innovation and are particularly 
attractive in chronic disease R&D, as drug provision will be long-term 
providing a steady income stream. 
Concerns have been raised about abuse of the system and that private industry 
has profited by public research, thereby making the public pay twice – once for 
the research and again for what is perceived to be an overpriced product. 
Changes in policy and many debates about possible changes to the OD Act 
have created uncertainty in the industry as to whether, after perhaps years of 
development, the rules may change. This uncertainty may retard development: 
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‘It is ironic that the very process of looking for a way to curb abuses in 
a statute designed to foster innovation, could deter that innovation.’  
(Rhode, 2000, p.138). 
5. The EU Orphan Drug Regulation (2000) 
The US Orphan Drug Act (1983) with its incentives, both financial and 
regulatory, has led to 837 medicinal products being awarded orphan drug 
status. At the end of 1997, 152 orphan products had obtained marketing 
approval. These products are now being used by over eight million patients 
(Reider, 2000). The 1983 Act is widely regarded as one of the most successful 
pieces of health-related legislation enacted so far in the USA, fostering the 
creation and growth of many small to medium sized biotechnology companies. 
These successes could potentially be repeated in the UK under the European 
Orphan Drug Regulation which became fully operational in May 2000 under 
pressure from the EU Parliament (Torrent-Farnell, 2001). The regulation 
provides incentives for drug manufacturers to invest in orphan drug R&D. 
Regulation 847/2000 stipulates the rules under which orphan drug status may 
be given in order to receive these incentives. Compliance to these rules 
requires detailed documentation and solid scientific evidence, ergo non-
contradictory to known scientific understanding. For example applicants have 
to prove a product is: 
‘ Intended for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of a life-
threatening or chronically debilitating condition affecting not more 
than 5:10,000 persons.’ 
Further proof is required that, without the Orphan Drug incentives, a product 
would be unlikely to generate sufficient returns to justify R&D and marketing 
investments. A comparison of the OD legislations of the EU, US, Japan and 
Australia are shown in Box 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
Box 2 
National Orphan Drug Regulations   
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 EU US Japan Australia? 
Year 2000 1983 1993 1998 
Prevalence     
per 10,000  <5 <7.5 <4.2 <1.1 
Protocol     
assistance 80% 
reduction 
Yes Yes No 
Fees     
waiver 50% 
reduction 
Yes c35% 
reduction 
Yes 
Market     
exclusivity 10* 7 10 ? 
Research     
grant No** Yes-FDA Max 50% 
p.a.#  
No 
Tax credit Up to 
member 
50% % decided by  
 state  KIKO No 
* This may be reduced to 6 years if OD criteria is no longer met, or OD 
becomes excessively profitable. 
** There are no grants available from EMEA or COMP but economic help is 
available from Member states or EU institutions (e.g. VIth Framework 
Programme). 
# This is subject to part repayment if sales reach more than 100m Yen. 
?  Australia is presently reviewing its OD procedures so these may change – 
results expected July 2002. 
Source: Adapted from Management Forum (2001) 
The costs of developing medicinal products for the treatment of rare (orphan) 
diseases are disproportionately high in relation to the volume of products likely 
to be sold, since there are few sufferers needing treatment. However the costs 
of developing drugs is disputed (see Box 3 below). The R&D strategies of the 
large UK pharmaceutical companies appear to be driven by the ‘big hits’ (such 
as cancer and heart disease) and do not include orphan drug or rare disease 
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research, due to a perceived lack of potential profit (Crompton 2001). Some 
research is already funded by member states, through public research 
laboratories and academic institutions, complemented by charities.  
‘The challenge of rare diseases is great because it’s an area that few 
actors have paid attention to, either from a discovery point of view or 
development process’ 
Andrea Rappagliosi: VP Health Policy and Government Relations, 
Serono International (2000) EPPOSI (2000). 
However this funding is not enough to pay for the clinical trials, 
manufacturing, patent, marketing and regulatory costs necessary to make 
therapies available for rare diseases. It normally requires the resources of the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry, with the added backing of venture 
capitalists (in some cases) to take promising projects forward. There was a firm 
commitment by the European Commission that patients suffering from rare 
diseases should be entitled to the same quality (of safety and efficacy) as other 
patients in the EU, hence the high scientific and ethical standards of the 
Regulation. Patient representation, in a new patient driven approach, was 
deemed paramount and patient representatives were included in a continuous 
dialogue with all other interested parties. One of the aims of the regulation was 
to boost research, development and innovation in novel drug developments, 
with particular attention to emerging biotechnology derived products (Torrent-
Farnell, 2001).  
 
6. Committee on Orphan Medicinal Products (COMP) 
 
COMP was formed by EMEA (European Medicines Evaluation Agency) in 
April 2000. COMP’s remit is to examine all applications for Orphan Medicinal 
Product (OMP) designation submitted in accordance with Regulation (EC) 
141/2000. COMP is comprised of 1 representative from each member state, 3 
from EMEA and 3 from patient organisations (total of 21 members. COMP 
advises the European Commission on the establishment and development of 
ODP policy and assists the Commission in drawing up detailed guidelines and 
liaising, at both the European level and internationally with the pharmaceutical 
industry, academia, learned societies, patient organisations and institutional 
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bodies on matters relating to OMPs ( www.emea.eu.int ). COMP, whilst doing 
scientific assessments does not perform the assessment on the quality, safety 
and efficacy of OMPs. 
.  
7. The disputed costs of research 
Support for orphan drug incentives are not universal. One staunch opponent 
who has lobbied the US Senate about what he sees as government sponsored 
monopolisation argues:  
 
‘The Orphan Drug Act is used to privatise something that is in the 
public domain, such as an invention paid for by tax dollars, or a patent 
that has expired. It is particularly important to a company when they 
have done the least to deserve the benefit. Companies use the Orphan 
Drug Act to stop other companies from investing in clinical research, 
or from bringing new innovative products to market… Companies that 
obtain Orphan drug designations in the United States use the 
exclusivity provisions to build a wall around an invention in the public 
domain, by obtaining patents on various manufacturing methods, 
treatment regimes or minor improvements in the product, in order to 
create barriers against entry by competitors’. 
Love (1999 www.cptech.org ) 
 
Love further claims, as examples: 
‘ Amgen used its Orphan Drug status to build a wall of manufacturing 
patents around EPO, which was in the public domain, and Bristol-
Myers Squibb used Orphan status to keep a competitor from 
submitting its own clinical research on the use of Palliate for Karposi’s 
sarcoma’ 
 
Public Citizen is a Washington based non-profit lobbying organisation 
with15,000 members, representing consumer interests. Congress Watch, which 
is one of its five divisions, produced a report Rx R&D Myths: The Case 
Against The Drug Industry’s R&D ‘’Scare Card’’ (July 2001 www.citizen.org 
14.11.01), which launches a scathing attack on the pharmaceutical industry’s 
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claim that it needs extraordinary profits to fund expensive, risky and 
innovative R&D and that any legislation that might lower prices or profits 
would harm millions of Americans. 
‘But this R&D scarecard – or canard – is built on myths, falsehoods 
and misunderstandings, all of which are made possible by the drug 
industry’s staunch refusal to open its R&D records to congressional 
investigators or other independent auditors.’      Public Citizen (2001) 
 
Their findings based on government studies, company filings with the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission and documents obtained via the 
Freedom of Information Act are reproduced here in full, due to their specific 
claims (backed by evidence, which can be followed up by the reader via the 
given website) in Box 4. 
 
 
Box 4: Signs of Abuse? 
? The drug industry’s claim that R&D costs total $500m for each new 
drug (including failures) is highly misleading. Extrapolated from an 
often misunderstood 1991 study by economist Joseph DiMasi, the 
$500m figure includes significant expenses that are tax deductible and 
unrealistic scenarios of risks. 
? The actual after-tax outlay – or what drug companies really spend on 
R&D – for each new drug (including failures) according to the DiMasi 
is approximately $110m (That’s in year 2000 dollars, based on data 
provided by drug companies 
? A simpler measure – also derived from data provided by the industry- 
suggests that after-tax R&D costs ranged from $57 to $71m for the 
average new drug brought to market in the 1990s, including failures. 
? Industry R&D risks and costs are often significantly reduced by 
taxpayer-funded research which ahs helped launch the most medically 
important drugs in recent years and many of the best-selling drugs, 
including all of the top five sellers in one recent year surveyed (1995). 
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? An internal National Institute of Health (NIH) document, obtained by 
Public Citizen through the Freedom of Information Act, shows how 
crucial taxpayer- funded research is to top-selling drugs. According to 
the NIH, taxpayer-funded scientists conducted 55% of the research 
projects that led to the discovery and development of the top five 
selling drugs in 1995. 
? The Industry fought and won, a nine-year legal battle to keep 
congressional investigators from the General Accounting Office from 
seeing the industry’s complete R&D records. Congress can subpoena 
the records but has refused to do so. That might owe to the fact that in 
1999-2000 the drug industry spent $262m on federal lobbying, 
campaign contributions and ads for candidates thinly disguised as 
‘issue’ ads.* 
? Drug industry R&D does not appear to be as risky as companies claim. 
In every year since 1982 the drug industry has been the most profitable 
in the United States, according to Fortune magazine’s rankings. During 
this time, the drug industry’s returns on revenue (profit as a percent of 
sales) have averaged about three times the average for all other 
industries represented in the Fortune 500. It defies logic that R&D 
investments are highly risky if the industry is consistently so profitable 
and returns from investments are so high. 
? Drug industry R&D is made less risky by the fact that only about 22% 
of the new drugs brought to market in the last two decades were 
innovative drugs that represented important therapeutic gains over 
existing drugs. Most were ‘me-too’ drugs’, which often replicate 
existing successful drugs. 
?  In addition to receiving research subsidies, the drug industry is lightly 
taxed, thanks to tax credits. The drug industry’s effective tax rate is 
about 40% less than the average for all other industries. 
? Drug companies also receive a huge financial incentive for testing the 
effects of drugs on children. This incentive called paediatric 
exclusivity, which Congress may re-authorise this year, amounts to 
$600m in additional profits per year for the drug industry – and that’s 
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just to get companies to test the safety of several hundred drugs for 
children. It is estimated that the cost of such tests is less than $100m 
per year.  
? The drug industry’s top priority increasingly is advertising and 
marketing, more than R&D. Increases in drug industry advertising 
budgets have averaged almost 40% a year since the government relaxed 
rules on direct-to-consumer advertising in 1997. Moreover, the Fortune 
500 drug companies dedicated 30% of their revenues to marketing and 
administration in the year 2000, and just 12% to R&D. *     
 
Further support, with references, is given by The Project on Government 
Oversight (POGO) at www.pogo.org/drugs/health.htm (11.12.01). POGO state 
that the pharmaceutical industry’s contribution to political candidates in 1997-
98 was $9.7m and the industry spent $74.4m on hired lobbyists. Spending on 
advertising in 1997 was $1b. POGO also report that pharmaceutical companies 
are delaying the production of generic drugs by ‘filing frivolous lawsuits for 
the sole purpose of delaying the expiration of patents’ 
 
8. Intellectual Property Rights – Patents, Market Exclusivity for Orphan 
Drugs 
 
Raw DNA (information) is not allowed to be patented as genes are not ‘man-
made’, however when whole genes, which are complex organic molecules, are 
isolated and purified from the chromosome where they reside they are eligible 
to be patented as chemical compounds. A genetically engineered bacterium 
was first patented in the US in 1980. Meanwhile the European Patent Office 
(EPO) did not extend the scope of patentable subject matter from plants (1989) 
to animals until 1992 (the Harvard ‘oncomouse’): 
‘This [delay] sparked years of litigation which contributed to 
significant uncertainty as to the level of protection provided by the 
EPO’ [regarding gene patents] ‘While Europe debated, the US 
innovated, producing such companies as Celera, Incyte and Amgen’ 
Corwin & Lesko (2000) 
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Larger US pharmaceutical companies were stimulated to pursue active 
genomic businesses. However Monsanto did not fare well in its marketing of 
genetically modified crops. Also whilst the US viewed innovation as an 
opportunity to compete globally, ‘to grow their nation’, the UK government 
‘was tempted to hide behind their version of regulation in order to do nothing’ 
(The Public Health Genetics Unit 1999). 
Pharmaceutical medicines are not considered as ordinary goods (World  
Intellectual Property Organisation [WIPO] 2001). The consumers cannot 
evaluate the quality, efficacy and safety of the drugs and because they play a 
significant social role in realisation of the fundamental right (as accorded by 
the WHO) to health. This is similar to the argument that health care is unique 
and should be approached differently from other social goods. 
A patent confers its owner a time limited monopoly right to operate in a 
defined technical area. Disclosure of patents promotes technological exchange 
and eventual copying into generic products. Patents are usually applied for 
early in the research stage to protect against competitors. Although eligibility 
for OD status can be attained at any stage of development. exclusivity under 
the OD regulation applies upon market approval by the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency (EMEA). 
‘Patents and orphan drug protections provide complementary 
protection for biomedical research and clinical development. Given 
time and provided that member states develop sensible drug pricing 
structures, this research will yield access to therapies for patients’ 
Cozens, P. (Propharma Partners Ltd) EPPOSI (2000) 
IPR policies need to respond rapidly to innovations in biotechnology, in order 
to exploit their economic worth and to encourage innovation fo r the good of 
society as a whole. There appears to be a problem in how to protect innovators, 
through IPR, to encourage technological development, without creating 
monopoly rights to powerful companies who may use the system to patent 
‘inventions’ which are far from original or inventive, stifling creative 
innovation by small players. IP is central to economic success and companies 
are developing IP strategies with the goal of creating barriers to competitors, 
whilst using technology such as corporate intelligence tools to exploit the 
 24 
strengths and weaknesses of competitors. (Intellectual Property Worldwide 
1999). IPR is becoming a strategic weapon for prosperous companies, using 
the complexity of IPR legislations against competitors by creating time delays, 
market uncertainties and huge legal costs, thereby causing the strangulation of 
innovation. An example of such strategy can be seen in a high technology 
precedent - Nintendo’s anti-trust and copyright litigation mentality led to the 
industry joke that Nintendo was in: ‘two businesses, video-games and 
litigation’ (see www.prcentral.com ). In biotechnology Thompson (2001) 
claims ‘everybodys suing everybody else to grab rights to potentially lucrative 
genes’, giving the examples of Elan v The Mayo Clinic, The University of 
Rochester v Pharmacia, Amgen v Transkaryotic Therapies, who have all 
clashed over patent disputes. The fear of ineffective or unfair IPR protection, 
especially in SMEs may deter Mode 2 knowledge producers from 
participation, thus hindering technological and economic progress. With the 
pressure on government funding for R&D private industry will need new 
incentives to increase their R&D and therefore need the assurance of IP 
protection in whichever medium they use to create knowledge else they will 
rely on secrecy. Secrecy threatens the expansion of knowledge and leads to the 
duplication of expensive research by others. 
 
Will patents on genetic material be to the publics’ benefit or will 
pharmaceutical companies use them to stifle competition and innovative, 
potentially life saving scientific advances? A balance between encouraging 
innovation and the availability of generic medicines is important. A strong 
generic sector is a powerful stimulus to innovation and a necessary component 
of cost-containment for the health care systems of member states. 
Genewatch U.K. accuse companies of using patents to stifle research and 
charging monopolistic prices thereby jeopardising healthcare and innovation. 
Genewatch (2001) give the case of Myriad Genetics Inc. who, between 1998-
2000, were awarded nine US patents on the breast / ovarian cancer genes 
BRCA1 and BRCA2. These gave Myriad the exclusive right to commercialise 
laboratory-testing services, diagnostic test kits and therapeutic products, which 
use these two gene sequences. Myriad defends its’ patents rigorously and 
legislatively and is accused by US researchers and laboratories of stifling 
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research and restricting women’s access to DNA testing. It is claimed that 
BRCA1’s discovery was based on international collaboration and the open 
exchange of information between disparate academic (public funded) 
researchers and laboratories. Patients themselves donated tissue and researched 
their family histories to provide clues. BRCA2s discovery is also claimed to 
follow  groundbreaking work at Britain’s charity-funded Sanger Centre and the 
Institute of Cancer Research (ICR). The Myriad BRCA1 gene was given an 
EPO patent on 10.1.01, allowing Myriad to profit. This patent is being opposed 
by the Institute Curie in France with the support of other organisations, for its 
overly broad claims and the threat that a Myriad monopoly would jeopardise 
research and hinder access to testing 
www.curie.net/actualities/myriad/declaration_e.htm (1.11.01). Myriad insists 
that tests are done through Myriad’s laboratory in the US (at almost three times 
the cost in France). The grounds for opposition are – lack of novelty, lack of 
inventive step and insufficient description. Another example given (see Box 5) 
is that of Amgen which patented DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin for a 
product called Epogen (EPO) in October 1987. The identification of the EPO 
protein in 1977 resulted from two decades of US government funded research. 
Amgen however won, through protracted litigation, the race to exclusive rights 
to manufacture its recombinant version of EPO (Epogen), which was the most 
expensive drug in the US Medicare scheme. In 1999 US sales of Epogen were 
worth c$1.8b 
Box 5: Amgen and Epogen 
Whilst its first EPO patents were process patents on isolating and cloning the 
gene, Amgen took out product patents in the 1990s which claim that it owns 
the rights to all artificial EPO made from mammalian cells. As a result, the 
company sued Transkaryotic Therapies (TKT) and Aventis on the grounds that 
they had infringed its patents by developing a technology to activate the EPO 
gene in human cells. Even though TKT only used regulatory sequences to 
activate EPO genes that were already present in the cells – and so consciously 
avoided the use of any of Amgens technologies _ Amgen won this crucial 
battle on 19th January 2001 with far reaching implications for future drug 
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development. If this decision is upheld on appeal Amgen’s strategic timing of 
its patent applications (the first was granted in 1987 while the last will expire 
in 2015) will extend its monopoly on Epogen to nearly 30 years, inflating drug 
costs and stifling competition for much longer than the 17 years for which 
patents are normally granted. (Reuters 22.1.01, quoted in Genewatch UK) 
 
Source: Genewatch UK (2001) 
Bioethics Professor Jon Merz claims that twice when he surveyed laboratory 
researchers around 25% reported that they had abandoned research because of 
established gene patents. Patents are believed to increase costs of academic 
research, thereby stifling new discoveries. 
‘Patent attorneys regularly advise researchers to restrict their 
presentations to colleagues, don’t show your work, don’t show your 
notebook, don’t give that talk, so as not to jeopardise the planned 
patent submissions. This has reversed the half-century culture of free 
and open communication in the scientific communities’ (King 2001). 
In 2000 a groundbreaking lawsuit was brought by parents of children suffering 
from Canavan disease (a rare progressive fatal disorder), against researchers at 
Miami Children’s Hospital who had patented a pre-natal test. The patent 
holders also tried to restrict the number of laboratories and the number of tests 
in order, it is alleged, to enable the hospital to issue an exclusive licence for the 
test and receive patent royalties. However the parents accuse the hospital of 
profiting from the children’s illness and hindering access to tests and future 
research. The researchers had been given, freely and for the public good, tissue 
from one family’s two dead children in 1981 for the Canavan project. The 
hospital patent even made free genetic screening too expensive to offer by rare 
disorder charities. 
 
‘The suit does not directly challenge the patent but alleges that the 
researchers secretly obtained it using the genetic information and 
financial resources that had been donated for the public good and 
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began charging royalties and limiting the availability of testing.’  
DeFrancesco (Editor Bioreseach Online) 2000. 
So are these isolated incidents that have arisen through greed, or anomalies in 
the patenting laws? 
 
9. Barriers to Orphan Drug development and availability 
As the EU Regulation is still in its infancy there may be teething problems, or 
unexpected or new problems may arise based on: 
? Exaggerated expectations fuelled by media hype or industry 
propaganda 
? Ungrounded fears about biotechnology: for example GM food. 
? Ethical objections: for example to the use of embryonic material. 
? Historically based fears of eugenics  
? Deficits in genetic services, diagnosis is a lottery (Crompton 2001) 
? A lack of multidisciplinary collaboration, between scientists themselves 
and science and industry, politicians, regulatory bodies etc. (Non 
‘joined up’ administrative departments). For example Francoise 
Grossetete (Member of the European Parliament  at EPPOSI 2000) 
raised concerns that EU member states had not taken any action to 
create a common research centre, instead preferring to encourage 
competition and rivalry. She urged members to join forces to overcome 
this medical obstacle. 
? A lack of, or decreasing funding for basic research to feed into 
industrial innovation. 
? Common drugs are tested on thousands of human patients to assess 
safety. In an orphan, geographically dispersed, population clinical trials 
may only be done on as few as one to four patients. Although the 
treatment may be better than nothing the side effects, which may be 
disastrous, may not be known. There is also concern about increased 
insurance costs and product liability claims, even though it is felt that 
courts will be sympathetic to industry. However the possibility of huge 
damages claims may discourage innovation in the OD market, 
especially for small firms. According to Buckingham (2001) after the 
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atrocity of September 11th, a tougher line has been taken by insurance 
underwriters, resulting in premiums having increased by 400% and 
liability cover reduced by 25%. Some sections of the pharmaceuticals 
sector may no longer be able to buy insurance cover at all in the 
commercial market. There are concerns also, from the insurance 
industry, about the quality of clinical trials, which have resulted in 
product recalls and claims for compensation from consumers. There is 
support for these concerns’ For example the Report of the Science 
Advisory Board, Committee on the Drug Review Process Appendix C-
2 (December 3, 1999) gives as one of four general observations:  
‘One is that the UK system of clinical trials of new products is 
controversial. A ten- year audit of such trials found that the 
procedures to decide the safety and effectiveness of new products 
were flawed to the point of endangering the health of those taking 
part. In a sample of 226 trials, significant under-reporting of side 
effects was found in about 30%. Insufficient proof of drugs being 
stored at the correct temperature was found in 55%, and 43% of 
patients were found  not  to have been given clear instructions about 
the use of the drug being tested. There have also been reports that 
international manufacturers have taken to testing their products in 
the UK in recent years because the trials they want would not be 
permitted in other jurisdictions, notably the United States. These 
allegations are of course contested’.  
? The American FDA is reported, by Buckingham (2001), to be giving fast 
track approvals in situations where it would not have done so twenty years 
ago. Pressure from consumers for new drugs also means that companies 
cannot carry out the extended trials they may have previously done. 
According to Buckingham (2001) insurers say life saving drugs may not be 
withheld from the public but admit that some ‘marginal treatments might not 
go into production. This may have severe repercussions for orphan drugs 
? Market fragmentation. Different health care systems in member states, 
which slows the uptake of innovative new medicines. There are 
different assessment criteria on cost-effectiveness which may make a 
drug cost-effective in one member state and not another due to price 
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differentials. There can be as much as 4 years between the first patient 
in one member state having access to an innovative new medicine and 
access to it being available to a fellow patient in another member state 
(EC, EDG 2000). 
? A lack of overall incentives for small to medium size (SME) 
companies. 
? The fear that broad gene patents may damage an environment of 
innovation. 
? Inadequate commitment from member states to follow EU legislation. 
? The National Institute for Clinical Excellence:- Beta Interferon is 
perceived to be of benefit to a sub-set of Multiple Sclerosis  (MS) 
patients. The issue of Beta Interferon’s use for the treatment of these 
‘relapsing / remitting’ (MS) patients was raised on 3.4.01 by Baroness 
Cumberlege, in the House of Lords (Lords Hansard text 210403-20). 
Beta Interferon was referred to NICE for approval on 6.8.99 and the 
results were not expected until November 2001. The desperate wait for 
this medicine extending to 27 months.Lord Clement Jones, n the same 
debate, argued that the incidence of relapsing remitting MS is 
3.8:10,000 of the general population so Interferon may be claimed to be 
the first OD assessed by NICE. There is a concern over the 
appropriateness of cost economic evaluation and this case raises 
fundamental questions about NICE’s future recommendations 
regarding the supply of treatments for rare diseases under the NHS. The 
development and production of OD faces a fourth hurdle after safety, 
quality and efficacy, as recognised by the pharmaceutical industry who 
see the UK as erecting barriers to innovation. It is not appropriate to 
use standard cost-effectiveness criteria in the assessment of a drug for a 
rare disease. The increase in health spending in the NHS (4.7% above 
inflation for three years) has to be spread between the reform 
programme under the White Paper ‘The New NHS. Modern and 
Dependable’ and liabilities under minimum pay legislation and the 
maximum working hours directive. There will be few additional 
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resources available  for opportunities presented by genetic advances 
(Ling 2000). 
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